NCD Reward Mint Bypass

The token also accumulates SGODZ and USDT-related balances on address(this). Those balances are supposed to support internal maintenance flows such as selling SGODZ for the base asset and pairing assets for liquidity adds. In the deployed contract, however, the functions that consume those balances are not access controlled.

The external warp helper at 0x8afd2be03147a3b05f430a3652088b049b32b373 is unverified, but its runtime behavior can still be recovered from bytecode, selector analysis, and storage diffs. The validator-confirmed helper analysis shows that priceInit() stores tx.gasprice into slot 0x0d, and warpToken(uint256) compares the current gas price to that slot to decide whether to return the full amount or a heavily reduced amount. The focused helper state diff for the exploit transaction shows that slot 0x0d changed from 7 gwei to 15 gwei, matching the exploit transaction’s gas price.

3. Vulnerability Analysis & Root Cause Summary

The incident is not a pure market-arbitrage event. It depends on three code-level failures in the victim system that an unprivileged actor can compose in one transaction. First, SpaceGodzilla lets any caller invoke reserve-management paths that spend balances owned by the token contract itself. Second, the helper state used to control buy-path reduction is mutable through a public function and can be rewritten immediately before the attacker buy. Third, the sell-fee suppression logic trusts a pair reserve delta heuristic rather than verifying actual liquidity mint semantics, so a trivial dust transfer can spoof the condition.

The violated invariant is straightforward: only protocol-controlled logic should spend SpaceGodzilla-owned balances, buy-path anti-bot state must not be reset by an arbitrary caller inside the exploit transaction, and sell-fee exemption must only trigger during genuine liquidity adds. The code-level breakpoints are swapTokensForOther(uint256) and swapAndLiquifyStepv1() being public, the helper’s public priceInit() mutating slot 13, and _isAddLiquidityV1() using bal1 - r1 > 1000 or bal0 - r0 > 1000 as its only decision rule.

4. Detailed Root Cause Analysis

The relevant victim code is explicit:

function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) internal override {
    bool isAddLdx;
    if (to == uniswapV2Pair) {
        isAddLdx = _isAddLiquidityV1();
    }

    if (_isExcludedFromFees[from] || _isExcludedFromFees[to] || isAddLdx) {
        takeFee = false;
    } else {
        if (from == uniswapV2Pair) {
            amount = warp.warpToken(amount);
        } else if (to == uniswapV2Pair) {
            warp.addTokenldx(amount);
        } else {
            takeFee = false;
        }
    }
}

function swapTokensForOther(uint256 tokenAmount) public { ... }
function swapAndLiquifyStepv1() public { ... }

The liquidity detector is equally weak:

function _isAddLiquidityV1() internal view returns (bool ldxAdd) {
    (uint r0, uint r1,) = IUniswapV2Pair(address(uniswapV2Pair)).getReserves();
    uint bal1 = IERC20(token1).balanceOf(address(uniswapV2Pair));
    if (token0 == address(this)) {
        if (bal1 > r1) {
            uint change1 = bal1 - r1;
            ldxAdd = change1 > 1000;
        }
    }
}

These sites explain the exploit sequence end to end. In the seed trace, the attacker first called the helper’s public priceInit(), and the helper storage diff shows slot 13 changing from 0x1a13b8600 (7 gwei) to 0x37e11d600 (15 gwei). That neutralized the buy-path reduction for the subsequent pair buy. The same trace then shows a public call to SpaceGodzilla::swapTokensForOther(69127461036369179405415017714), which caused the token contract to transfer its own SGODZ inventory into the pair and move the price materially against future buyers.

Human-labeled excerpt from the exploit trace:

0x8AfD2be03147a3b05f430A3652088b049B32b373::priceInit()
  storage slot 13: 0x...01a13b8600 -> 0x...037e11d600

SpaceGodzilla::swapTokensForOther(69127461036369179405415017714)
  emit Transfer(from: SpaceGodzilla, to: SGODZ/USDT Pair, amount: 69127461036369179405415017714)

After that reserve reshaping, the attacker bought SGODZ from the pair while the refreshed helper latch allowed the full amount through the buy path. Later in the same transaction, the attacker transferred 20000 wei of USDT into the pair before selling back the purchased SGODZ. Because _isAddLiquidityV1() only checks whether the pair’s live USDT balance exceeds the stored reserve by more than 1000, this dust donation caused the function to return true. The result was a fee-free transfer of the attacker’s full SGODZ balance into the pair.

The decisive sell-side trace fragment is:

BEP20USDT::balanceOf(SGODZ/USDT Pair) -> reserve + 20000
emit Transfer(from: attacker_contract, to: SGODZ/USDT Pair, amount: 71562167863336388351131715170010)
0x8AfF4e8d24F445Df313928839eC96c4A618a91C8::swap(
  amount0In = 71562167863336388351131715170010,
  amount1In = 20000,
  amount1Out = 2978176485325154862214560
)

The balance diff closes the loop: the attacker EOA gained 25378755321988456881827 USDT, the token contract lost 30378842175602511050329 USDT, and the pair retained the remainder created by the manipulated round trip.

5. Adversary Flow Analysis

The adversary cluster consists of EOA 0x00a62eb08868ec6feb23465f61aa963b89e57e57 and attacker contract 0x3d817ea746edd02c088c4df47c0ece0bd28dcd72. The contract was deployed in transaction 0xa56d0f02f641c000d8a3a54b3d7611f4689761447e75b04b942ebae915f544ee, 30 blocks before the exploit, and then used to execute the full flashloan strategy in the seed transaction.

The observable exploit flow is:

1. Borrow transient liquidity and enter the orchestrator path from the attacker contract.
2. Call priceInit() on the warp helper to rewrite the gas-price latch from 7 gwei to the current 15 gwei.
3. Call swapTokensForOther() so SpaceGodzilla sells its own SGODZ inventory into the pair.
4. Buy SGODZ from the now-distorted pair state while warpToken() returns the full amount after the latch update.
5. Call swapAndLiquifyStepv1() to consume more victim-owned balances through another public maintenance path.
6. Transfer 20000 wei of USDT into the pair so _isAddLiquidityV1() misclassifies the next sell as a liquidity-add path.
7. Transfer the attacker’s full SGODZ position back into the pair with no sell fee and swap out 2978176485325154862214560 USDT.
8. Repay the flashloan legs and leave the attacker EOA with net USDT profit.

The transaction sequence is feasible for any unprivileged actor because every critical call surface is public, the relevant code and state are reconstructible from public chain data, and the sequence requires no privileged keys or attacker-only artifacts.

6. Impact & Losses

The root-cause artifacts attribute the direct victim-side loss to SpaceGodzilla’s USDT holdings. The measured loss is:

• Victim contract 0x2287c04a15bb11ad1358ba5702c1c95e2d13a5e0: 30378842175602511050329 USDT base units.
• Attacker EOA 0x00a62eb08868ec6feb23465f61aa963b89e57e57: 25378755321988456881827 USDT base units gained.

The difference between victim loss and attacker profit remains in the manipulated trading path, including the pair state and the attacker’s deliberate 20000-wei dust transfer. The incident therefore caused a deterministic economic loss to the protocol-owned balances while demonstrating that the fee and reserve-management design was permissionlessly exploitable.

7. References

1. Seed exploit transaction: 0x7f183df11f1a0225b5eb5bb2296b5dc51c0f3570e8cc15f0754de8e6f8b4cca4
2. Related attacker-contract deployment: 0xa56d0f02f641c000d8a3a54b3d7611f4689761447e75b04b942ebae915f544ee
3. SpaceGodzilla verified source: artifacts/collector/seed/56/0x2287c04a15bb11ad1358ba5702c1c95e2d13a5e0/src/Contract.sol
4. Helper selector and storage analysis: artifacts/collector/iter_1/contract/56/0x8afd2be03147a3b05f430a3652088b049b32b373/analysis_summary.json
5. Focused helper state diff: artifacts/collector/iter_1/tx/56/0x7f183df11f1a0225b5eb5bb2296b5dc51c0f3570e8cc15f0754de8e6f8b4cca4/helper_state_diff_focused.json
6. Helper and pair call slice summary: artifacts/collector/iter_1/tx/56/0x7f183df11f1a0225b5eb5bb2296b5dc51c0f3570e8cc15f0754de8e6f8b4cca4/helper_pair_call_slice_summary.json
7. Seed balance diff: artifacts/collector/seed/56/0x7f183df11f1a0225b5eb5bb2296b5dc51c0f3570e8cc15f0754de8e6f8b4cca4/balance_diff.json