The root cause is a protocol bug in LPMine’s reward calculation: it values LP positions off flash-loan-sensitive reserves via getRemoveTokens and getEachReward, aggregates WTO rewards across both WTO and COAR LP legs, and allows extractReward(1) to repeatedly tap COAR-leg WTO rewards without updating coarRewardTime. All calls are available to any unprivileged user.

2. Key Background

• Protocol and contracts
  • LPMine (0x6BBeF6DF8db12667aE88519090984e4F871e5feb) is a liquidity-mining contract on BSC. It accepts LP tokens for two tokens (WTO and COAR) and rewards stakers with WTO and COAR over time. For each user it tracks:
    • wtoLpAmount and coarLpAmount (LP token balances),
    • depositTime, wtoLpBackTime, coarLpBackTime,
    • wtoRewardTime and coarRewardTime.
  • RewardPool (TokenDistributor) (0x3200Be834b791D09017Bd924c71174e47959b087) is a TokenDistributor-style contract created by LPMine’s constructor. It stores rewards (including WTO) and exposes claimToken(token, amount, to), callable only by its owner/admin (LPMine), to transfer reward tokens to stakers and invitees.
• Tokens and AMMs
  • WTO (0x692097F0d3Bd0dFBbbbb0EE35000729F05d598f5) and ZF (0x259A9FB74d6A81eE9b3a3D4EC986F08fbb42121A) are ERC20 tokens with fee-on-transfer mechanics when interacting with their Pancake pairs. Verified sources show WTO has a burn pool and owner-controlled fee parameters, but no anti-flash-loan safeguards at the token level.
  • LPMine uses two main PancakeSwap V2 pairs to value LP positions and calculate a “monthly fee” via PancakeRouter::getAmountsOut:
    • ZF/USDT pair: 0xBE2F4D0C39416C7C4157eBFdccB65cc2FF5fb2C4.
    • WTO/USDT pair: 0x6F9070D449798f4a77d43B80ddfAAcabD456d50f.
  • A Pancake V3 pool 0x36696169C63e42cd08ce11f5deeBbCeBae652050 is later used to borrow USDT via flash loans.
• Attacker structure
  • Primary EOA: 0x593749d5414d8a735cda16e4b47cc9bfa47d5683
    • Sender of all three key transactions (0x11c1ef2c..., 0x00c5a772..., 0xf33f40ee...).
    • Ultimate recipient of BNB profit as shown by native balance diffs.
  • Helper contract: 0x0557f67b2D5Dc575fe3e433E7caf71eA523979fD
    • Interacts with routers, pools, and LPMine.
    • Orchestrates swaps, the flash loan, and repeated LPMine::extractReward calls.
    • Temporarily holds WTO and USDT before forwarding USDT to the EOA.

Code snippet – LPMine and TokenDistributor structure

Origin: collected LPMine source (verified on explorer) and embedded TokenDistributor for contract 0x6BBeF6DF....

contract TokenDistributor {
    address public _owner;
    address public _admin;
    constructor (address admin) {
        _owner = msg.sender;
        _admin = admin;
    }

    function claimToken(address token, uint256 amount, address to) external {
        require(msg.sender == _admin || msg.sender == _owner);
        IERC20(token).transfer(to, amount);
    }
}

contract LPMine is Ownable {
    using SafeMath for uint256;
    address private immutable usdtAddress;
    IUniswapV2Router02 private immutable uniswapV2Router;
    TokenDistributor public immutable rewardPool;
    // ...
    struct PledgeInfo {
        uint256 wtoLpAmount;
        uint256 coarLpAmount;
        uint256 depositTime;
        uint256 wtoLpBackTime;
        uint256 coarLpBackTime;
        uint256 wtoRewardTime;
        uint256 coarRewardTime;
    }
    mapping(address => PledgeInfo) public userPledge;
    // ...
}

Caption: LPMine deploys an internal TokenDistributor reward pool and tracks per-user WTO/COAR LP positions and reward timestamps used in the faulty reward calculation.

3. Act Opportunity and Transaction Sequence

3.1 Pre-state at Block 45,583,892 (σ_B)

At block height 45,583,892 (0x2b78e14), the relevant public BSC state is:

• LPMine 0x6BBeF6DF... is deployed with WTO and COAR tokens registered, monthFee configured, and rewardPool 0x3200Be83... funded with WTO.
• The ZF/USDT pair 0xBE2F4D0... and WTO/USDT pair 0x6F9070D4... exist with non-zero liquidity.

This is supported by:

• Seed metadata for tx 0x11c1ef2c... at this block.
• Verified LPMine source in Contract.sol.
• Verified token sources for ZF and WTO under the collected contract sources.

3.2 Adversary Transaction Sequence (b)

The attack unfolds through three adversary-crafted transactions on chain BSC (56):

1. Tx 1 – LP priming (index 1, 0x11c1ef2c61f5a2e41d570a1547d2d891bf916853ddd94e32097e86bcdd21cb4c)

   • The EOA 0x593749d5... sends 1 BNB to helper contract 0x0557f67b... and calls a pledge(uint256)-style entrypoint.
   • The helper uses standard PancakeRouter operations to:
     • Swap BNB for USDT.
     • Add ZF/USDT liquidity into PancakePair 0xBE2F4D0....
   • It then stakes the resulting LP tokens into LPMine via partakeAddLp(2, ..., 0x114FAA79...), creating a large coarLpAmount for user 0x0557f67b... with coarRewardTime set to the block timestamp.
   • No privileged roles or whitelists are involved; all components are public router/pair contracts plus the unprivileged helper.

2. Tx 2 – Core exploit (index 2, 0x00c5a772a58b117f142b2cbc8721b80d145ef7a910043ad08439863d0e78e300)

   • The same EOA calls helper contract 0x0557f67b....
   • The helper borrows 5,000,000 USDT via PancakeV3Pool::flash from 0x36696169..., a permissionless V3 pool.
   • It routes the borrowed USDT into the public ZF/USDT pair 0xBE2F4D0..., inflating reserves and spot prices.
   • While reserves are inflated, it calls LPMine::extractReward(1) repeatedly, using the bugged reward logic to over-claim WTO from rewardPool.
   • All steps use public pool/router interfaces; flash loans, swaps, and calls to LPMine::extractReward(1) and rewardPool::claimToken are available to any user with gas.

3. Tx 3 – Profit realization (index 3, 0xf33f40ee0da9edebdb5cb463b37ef55df38e09690d7f68e333cf4a63046dd4cd)

   • The same EOA calls UniversalRouter 0x1A0A18AC4BECDDbd6389559687d1A73d8927E416.
   • The calldata uses permit on a helper token 0x31c2F6fc... to authorize spending of the EOA’s USDT.
   • UniversalRouter swaps USDT into WBNB via Pancake V3 pools 0x172fcd41... and 0xf2688Fb5..., unwraps WBNB to BNB, and returns BNB to the EOA.
   • UniversalRouter and the pools are fully public; inclusion requires no special rights beyond owning the USDT and providing a valid permit signature.

3.3 Profit Predicate (π – Profit in BNB)

The exploit predicate is a profit-based condition in the reference asset BNB, measured on the attacker EOA 0x593749d5... across the three transactions.

• Reference asset: BNB (native BSC asset).
• Adversary address: 0x593749d5....
• Fees: Gas and flash-loan fees are already reflected in the native balance deltas for the three transactions; they are not further decomposed.
• Pre- and post-values: Absolute BNB wealth before/after is not reconstructed (value_before_in_reference_asset and value_after_in_reference_asset are marked “unknown”), but the net delta is computed exactly from traces.

From balance_diff.json files:

• Setup tx (0x11c1ef2c...)
  • Native delta: -1,001,691,652,000,000,000 wei (≈ -1.001691652 BNB).
• Exploit tx (0x00c5a772...)
  • Native delta: -129,234,354,000,000,000 wei (≈ -0.129234354 BNB).
• Aggregator tx (0xf33f40ee...)
  • Native delta: +34,946,275,134,109,987,855 wei (≈ +34.946275134109987855 BNB).

Summing these yields:

ΔBNB_EOA = -1,001,691,652,000,000,000
         + -129,234,354,000,000,000
         + 34,946,275,134,109,987,855
         = 33,815,349,128,109,987,855 wei
         ≈ +33.815349128109987855 BNB

Thus the attacker EOA’s net profit, after gas and flash-loan fees, is +33.815349128109987855 BNB.

4. Vulnerability & Root Cause Analysis

4.1 Overview of the Logic

LPMine’s reward calculation is implemented through a combination of:

• getCanClaimed(address _user) – computes pending WTO and COAR rewards for a user based on stored LP amounts, reward timestamps, and current pool reserves.
• getRemoveTokens(address _pair, address _usdtAddress, address _tokenAddress, uint256 _liquidity) – approximates the USDT and token amounts backing a given LP position using current AMM reserves.
• getEachReward(uint256 _valueU, uint256 _monthFee, address _wtoAddress, address _coarAddress, address _usdtAddress) – converts a USDT-denominated notional value into per-second WTO and COAR accrual rates using PancakeRouter::getAmountsOut.
• extractReward(uint256 _tokenId) – initiates reward claims for a user and updates reward timestamps.

The defect arises from:

1. Using spot AMM reserves that are vulnerable to flash-loan manipulation.
2. Summing rewards across both WTO and COAR LP legs into a single WTO reward figure.
3. Updating only one reward timestamp on extraction (wtoRewardTime when claiming WTO), leaving the COAR-leg WTO component untouched and re-claimable.

4.2 LP Valuation via Flash-Loan-Sensitive Reserves

Within getCanClaimed:

function getCanClaimed(address _user) public view returns (uint256 _wtoAmount, uint256 _coarAmount) {
    PledgeInfo memory _pledge = userPledge[_user];
    Token memory _wtoToken = tokens[wtoTokenId];
    Token memory _coarToken = tokens[coarTokenId];
    if (_pledge.wtoLpAmount > 0) {
        (uint256 _removeUsdt,) = getRemoveTokens(_wtoToken.pair, usdtAddress, _wtoToken.tokenAddress, _pledge.wtoLpAmount);
        uint256 _valueU = _removeUsdt.mul(2);
        uint256 _rewardTime = block.timestamp.sub(_pledge.wtoRewardTime);
        (uint256 _secondWtoAmount, uint256 _secondCoarAmount) =
            getEachReward(_valueU, monthFee, _wtoToken.tokenAddress, _coarToken.tokenAddress, usdtAddress);
        _wtoAmount += _rewardTime.mul(_secondWtoAmount);
        _coarAmount += _rewardTime.mul(_secondCoarAmount);
    }
    // COAR leg handled similarly...
}

Origin: collected LPMine source for 0x6BBeF6DF....

getRemoveTokens itself reads the current reserves of the AMM pair:

function getRemoveTokens(address _pair, address _usdtAddress, address _tokenAddress, uint256 _liquidity)
    private
    view
    returns (uint256 _removeUsdt, uint256 _removeToken)
{
    uint _usdtAmount = IERC20(_usdtAddress).balanceOf(_pair);
    uint _tokenAmount = IERC20(_tokenAddress).balanceOf(_pair);
    uint _totalSupply = IERC20(_pair).totalSupply();
    _removeUsdt = _liquidity.mul(_usdtAmount) / _totalSupply;
    _removeToken = _liquidity.mul(_tokenAmount) / _totalSupply;
}

Because _usdtAmount and _tokenAmount come from the current pool balances, any temporary injection of USDT (such as a flash loan deposited into the pair) directly increases _removeUsdt and thus _valueU = 2 * _removeUsdt. This is true even if the user’s LP position and the underlying economics have not changed.

4.3 Conversion into Per-Second WTO and COAR Rewards

getEachReward converts _valueU into per-second reward rates using current spot prices:

function getEachReward(
    uint256 _valueU,
    uint256 _monthFee,
    address _wtoAddress,
    address _coarAddress,
    address _usdtAddress
) public view returns (uint256, uint256) {
    uint256 _monthFeeAmount = calculateFee(_valueU, _monthFee);
    (, uint256 _outWtoAmount) = getAmountOut(_usdtAddress, _wtoAddress, _monthFeeAmount);
    (, uint256 _outCoarAmount) = getAmountOut(_usdtAddress, _coarAddress, _monthFeeAmount);
    uint256 _secondWtoAmount = _outWtoAmount / 30 days;
    uint256 _secondCoarAmount = _outCoarAmount / 30 days;
    return (_secondWtoAmount, _secondCoarAmount);
}

getAmountOut uses PancakeRouter::getAmountsOut between USDT and the target token (WTO or COAR), again at spot prices with no TWAP or bounds:

function getAmountOut(address _token0, address _token1, uint256 _amountIn)
    internal
    view
    returns (address[] memory, uint256)
{
    address[] memory _path = new address[](2);
    _path[0] = _token0;
    _path[1] = _token1;
    if (IUniswapV2Factory(uniswapV2Router.factory()).getPair(_token0, _token1) == address(0)) {
        return (_path, 0);
    }
    uint256[] memory _amountOut = uniswapV2Router.getAmountsOut(_amountIn, _path);
    uint256 _out = _amountOut[1];
    return (_path, _out);
}

When reserves and prices are transiently inflated by a flash loan, _outWtoAmount and _outCoarAmount become artificially large, and dividing by 30 days produces outsized per-second accrual rates.

4.4 Double Counting across WTO and COAR LP Legs

For a user with both wtoLpAmount and coarLpAmount:

• The WTO leg contributes to _wtoAmount and _coarAmount based on wtoLpAmount and wtoRewardTime.
• The COAR leg independently contributes again to _wtoAmount and _coarAmount based on coarLpAmount and coarRewardTime.

Thus _wtoAmount aggregates contributions from both LP legs. In the exploit, the attacker’s large COAR LP position dominates WTO entitlement.

4.5 One-Sided Timestamp Update in extractReward

extractReward reads the combined rewards and then updates only one timestamp, depending on which token is being claimed:

function extractReward(uint256 _tokenId) external {
    (uint256 _wtoAmount, uint256 _coarAmount) = getCanClaimed(_msgSender());
    PledgeInfo storage _pledge = userPledge[_msgSender()];
    uint256 _canReward;
    address _tokenAddress;
    if (_tokenId == wtoTokenId) {
        _canReward = _wtoAmount;
        _tokenAddress = tokens[wtoTokenId].tokenAddress;
        _pledge.wtoRewardTime = block.timestamp;
    }
    if (_tokenId == coarTokenId) {
        _canReward = _coarAmount;
        _tokenAddress = tokens[coarTokenId].tokenAddress;
        _pledge.coarRewardTime = block.timestamp;
    }
    if (_canReward > 0) {
        rewardPool.claimToken(_tokenAddress, _canReward, _msgSender());
        rewardParent(_tokenId, _tokenAddress, _canReward, _msgSender());
    }
}

When a user calls extractReward(1) (WTO):

• _wtoAmount includes contributions from both WTO and COAR legs.
• Only wtoRewardTime is updated; coarRewardTime is not, leaving the COAR-leg WTO portion effectively untouched and re-claimable.

This asymmetric update is the key bug: it permits repeated extractReward(1) calls to re-consume COAR-leg WTO rewards, especially when _secondWtoAmount is temporarily inflated by manipulated reserves.

4.6 Summary of the Root Cause

The root cause is the interaction of:

• Flash-loan-sensitive LP valuation (getRemoveTokens + getEachReward using current AMM reserves and spot prices).
• Aggregated WTO rewards across multiple LP legs, so that WTO entitlement reflects both WTO and COAR contributions.
• One-sided timestamp update in extractReward, which fails to advance coarRewardTime when WTO is claimed via tokenId == 1.

RewardPool’s claimToken function simply transfers whatever amount LPMine instructs it to, with no hard cap tied to deposits or global emission schedules, so once the per-user reward computation is compromised, over-distribution directly drains WTO from the pool.

5. Adversary Flow Analysis

5.1 Adversary-Related Accounts

• Adversary cluster

  • EOA 0x593749d5...
    • Originates all three key transactions (0x11c1ef2c..., 0x00c5a772..., 0xf33f40ee...).
    • Final beneficiary of BNB profit as shown by native balance deltas.
  • Helper contract 0x0557f67b...
    • Called by the EOA in setup and exploit txs.
    • Executes swaps, adds liquidity, initiates the V3 flash loan, and calls LPMine::partakeAddLp and LPMine::extractReward repeatedly.
    • Receives WTO and USDT and forwards USDT to the EOA before the aggregator step.

• Victim-side contracts and pools

  • LPMine (0x6BBeF6DF...) – verified mining contract whose reward logic is exploited.
  • RewardPool (TokenDistributor) (0x3200Be83...) – holds WTO on behalf of LPMine and is drained via claimToken.
  • ZF/USDT PancakePair (0xBE2F4D0C...) – AMM whose reserves are inflated by the USDT flash loan to distort valuation.
  • WTO/USDT PancakePair (0x6F9070D4...) – AMM that receives WTO as part of reward distribution and subsequent swaps.

Other addresses:

• Referral/admin addresses 0x114FAA79... and 0xa6184d66... receive substantial WTO allocations during the exploit through referral logic and/or admin participation.
• Txlists for these addresses show no immediate forwarding of WTO back to the attacker EOA within the incident block range, so their gains are treated as separate beneficiaries rather than attacker-controlled relays.

5.2 Lifecycle Stages

Stage 1: LP Priming in LPMine (Tx 0x11c1ef2c..., Block 45,583,892)

In the first stage, the attacker prepares a large COAR LP position in LPMine:

• The EOA 0x593749d5... funds the helper contract 0x0557f67b... with 1 BNB and triggers its pledge-like entrypoint.
• The helper:
  • Swaps BNB for USDT via PancakeRouter.
  • Adds ZF/USDT liquidity into pair 0xBE2F4D0....
  • Stakes the resulting LP into LPMine by calling:

LPMine::partakeAddLp(2, 2116514175087740339695220908, 348709159477963095424, 0x114FAA79157c6Ba61818CE2A383841e56B20250B)

Origin: seed transaction trace for 0x11c1ef2c....

The trace records the following event:

emit AddLP(
  account: 0x0557f67b2D5Dc575fe3e433E7caf71eA523979fD,
  tokenAddress: ZF: [0x259A9FB74d6A81eE9b3a3D4EC986F08fbb42121A],
  lpAmount: 700983951491979097527157,
  time: 1736332913
)

Caption: Seed transaction trace showing the helper contract staking ZF/USDT LP tokens into LPMine, establishing a large coarLpAmount with a fresh coarRewardTime.

This establishes:

• A large coarLpAmount for user 0x0557f67b....
• coarRewardTime ≈ block timestamp of this transaction.
• The necessary LP position that will later be used to over-claim WTO rewards.

Stage 2: Flash-Loan-Assisted Reward Extraction (Tx 0x00c5a772..., Block 45,586,395)

The second stage is the core exploit:

• The helper obtains a flash loan of 5,000,000 USDT from PancakeV3Pool 0x36696169...:

PancakeV3Pool::flash(
  0x0557f67b2D5Dc575fe3e433E7caf71eA523979fD,
  5000000000000000000000000,
  0,
  0x...03e8
)

Origin: exploit transaction trace for 0x00c5a772....

• The helper transfers the borrowed USDT into the ZF/USDT pair 0xBE2F4D0..., dramatically increasing USDT reserves and distorting the price of ZF and WTO relative to USDT.
• While the pool is distorted, the helper calls LPMine::extractReward(1) in a very tight loop. The trace shows hundreds of such calls:

LPMine::extractReward(1)
LPMine::extractReward(1)
...

Origin: exploit transaction trace with repeated LPMine::extractReward(1) calls.

• For each call:
  • getCanClaimed and getEachReward recompute WTO and COAR rewards using the inflated reserves from getRemoveTokens and getAmountsOut.
  • Because extractReward(1) updates only wtoRewardTime, the COAR-leg WTO component based on coarLpAmount and coarRewardTime remains effectively un-reset and is re-counted in subsequent calls.
  • rewardPool.claimToken(WTO, amount, to) transfers WTO out to:
    • 0x0557f67b... (helper),
    • Referral/admin addresses 0x114FAA79... and 0xa6184d66...,
    • WTO/USDT pair 0x6F9070D4....

From the high-resolution balance_diff.json for tx 0x00c5a772...:

{
  "token": "0x692097f0d3bd0dfbbbbb0ee35000729f05d598f5",
  "holder": "0x3200be834b791d09017bd924c71174e47959b087",
  "before": "402632180519764450575928594",
  "after": "342495981919748743312066",
  "delta": "-402289684537844701832616528",
  "contract_name": "WTO"
}

Caption: Exploit transaction balance diff showing RewardPool’s WTO balance decreasing by 402,289,684,537,844,701,832,616,528 tokens.

Companion entries show the corresponding WTO increases for the recipients:

{
  "holder": "0x114faa79157c6ba61818ce2a383841e56b20250b",
  "delta": "22771114219123285009393176",
  "contract_name": "WTO"
}
{
  "holder": "0xa6184d66bf2065b37d00d66774f25b383c9e99f7",
  "delta": "11385557109561642504696700",
  "contract_name": "WTO"
}
{
  "holder": "0x6f9070d449798f4a77d43b80ddfaacabd456d50f",
  "delta": "368133013209159774318526652",
  "contract_name": "WTO"
}

Caption: WTO deltas to referral/admin addresses and the WTO/USDT pair, matching the claimed over-distribution path.

After securing WTO, the helper swaps a large portion into USDT and transfers exactly 24,281,504,512,615,756,400,792 USDT to the attacker EOA.

Stage 3: Profit Realization via UniversalRouter (Tx 0xf33f40ee..., Block 45,586,459)

In the final stage, the EOA monetizes the USDT:

• The EOA calls UniversalRouter 0x1A0A18AC4BECDDbd6389559687d1A73d8927E416, passing calldata that:
  • Uses 0x31c2F6fcFf4F8759b3Bd5Bf0e1084A055615c768::permit to allow UniversalRouter to spend its USDT.
  • Executes swaps through Pancake V3 pools and unwraps WBNB to BNB.

From the trace:

UniversalRouter::execute(...)
  ├─ 0x31c2F6fc...::permit(0x593749D5..., ..., UniversalRouter, ...)
  ├─ PancakeV3Pool::swap(...)
  │   ├─ BEP20USDT::transferFrom(0x593749D5..., PancakeV3Pool 0x172fcd41..., 20812718153670648343536)
  │   ├─ BEP20USDT::transferFrom(0x593749D5..., 0x92b7807b..., 3468786358945108057256)
  ├─ WBNB::withdraw(...)
  └─ fallback{value: ...}(0x593749D5...)

Origin: iter_2 trace.cast.log for tx 0xf33f40ee....

The corresponding native balance diff shows:

{
  "address": "0x593749d5414d8a735cda16e4b47cc9bfa47d5683",
  "before_wei": "867743108000000000",
  "after_wei": "35814018242109987855",
  "delta_wei": "34946275134109987855"
}

Caption: Aggregator transaction balance diff confirming a BNB gain of 34.946275134109987855 for the attacker EOA.

When combined with the earlier negative deltas for the setup and exploit txs, this yields the net profit of +33.815349128109987855 BNB.

6. Impact & Losses

6.1 Token-Level Loss

The primary loss is in WTO:

• Total WTO loss from RewardPool:
  • 402,289,684,537,844,701,832,616,528 WTO.
  • This is the delta in RewardPool’s WTO balance during the exploit tx 0x00c5a772... and far exceeds any legitimate earnings from the attacker’s LP deposit.

6.2 Distribution of Stolen WTO

From the exploit balance diff and traces:

• RewardPool 0x3200Be83... sends WTO to:
  • Helper contract 0x0557f67b....
  • Referral/admin addresses 0x114FAA79... and 0xa6184d66....
  • WTO/USDT pool 0x6F9070D4....
• This effectively drains a large portion of RewardPool’s WTO reserves and redistributes it to:
  • The attacker cluster (EOA + helper), who ultimately convert a substantial share to USDT and then to BNB.
  • Non-cluster recipients (referral/admin addresses) whose txlists show no immediate forwarding of WTO to the EOA within the incident window.

6.3 Attacker Profit

• The attacker cluster’s realized profit is at least +33.815349128109987855 BNB, computed as the net native balance delta of the EOA across the three attacker-crafted transactions.
• This figure already accounts for:
  • All gas spent by the EOA in txs 0x11c1ef2c..., 0x00c5a772..., and 0xf33f40ee....
  • Flash-loan fees, which are reflected in the movement of assets during the exploit and aggregator transactions.

7. References

The analysis is supported by the following key artifacts:

• [1] LPMine source (getCanClaimed/getEachReward/getRemoveTokens/extractReward)
  • Collected contract source and ABI for 0x6BBeF6DF..., including the reward calculation functions and embedded TokenDistributor.
• [2] Setup tx 0x11c1ef2c... trace and balance diff
  • Seed trace and balance_diff.json document the initialization of the COAR LP position via LPMine::partakeAddLp and the associated AddLP event.
• [3] Exploit tx 0x00c5a772... trace and balance diff
  • Iteration-1 trace and balance_diff.json show the flash loan, repeated LPMine::extractReward(1) calls, TokenDistributor::claimToken executions, and the full WTO/USDT redistribution.
• [4] Aggregator tx 0xf33f40ee... trace and balance diff
  • Iteration-2 trace and balance_diff.json reconstruct the UniversalRouter call tree, USDT transferFrom operations from the EOA, WBNB unwrap, and the final BNB credit that yields the +34.946275134109987855 BNB delta for the EOA.

Taken together, these artifacts deterministically support the conclusion that a protocol bug in LPMine’s reward accounting, when combined with flash-loan-based reserve manipulation, allowed an unprivileged attacker to over-claim WTO from RewardPool and realize a substantial BNB profit.